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What does an anthropological critique of value require? And what is the use, and
challenge, of asking this question in relation to the law? The idea of ‘critique’ refers
here to a frontal questioning of the notion of value, not to a contribution to a theory
thereof: calling it ‘anthropological’ entails a focus on the constitution of meaning,
with ‘value’ understood as a key cultural parameter of economic life, best expressed
today in the imperatives of finance.
Requirements for an anthropological critique of
value
One first requirement would be to consider value as a vernacular concept,
not as analytical category. A vernacular concept that is to be found at work in
mundane situations in which particular states of affairs are justified or criticized.
The concept appears to be at work, notably, in situations in which something is
said to be wrong with a price (a price that is considered to be too high, as in a so-
called bubble, or too low, as in a crash or in the case of a so-called ‘depressed
asset’), the notion of a right, true, accurate value being invoked there in order to
criticize that price. A vernacular concept of value appears also to be at work in the
scientific-normative narratives of political economy, for instance in those that aim at
spotting contradictions between one particular economic process and what ‘value’
should really be about (or, on the contrary, at justifying an economic process by
demonstrating that it reflects value perfectly well). A second requirement for such an
anthropological critique of value would be to consider how this vernacular concept
operates, in particular historical settings, as a political technology, in the sense put
forward by Michel Foucault. In this capacity, two related vectors of analysis come
into play: vernacular theories of value are vindicated in terms of truth and accuracy
(‘véridiction’, in Foucauldian parlance), while they are set to work in the form of
dispositions, techniques, measures and rules that determine what should be done
and how (‘gouvernementalité’).
This approach suits finance quite aptly, especially insofar as finance itself represents
the emergence and consolidation of a political technology associated with a
particular idea of value. In finance, the notion of value (or ‘value creation’, as
the vernaculars of financial reasoning have it) is conceived of as stemming from
an investment perspective: a perspective that locates the realization of value in
the future (‘return on investment’), but a future deemed uncertain, with the risks
surrounding the yield requiring the discounting of time. Notions of ‘discounted
cash flow’, ‘net present value’ and ‘cost of capital’ populate this worldview as ways
to determine what true value (known as ‘fundamental value’) ought to be about,
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from the perspective of a free investor, stated sometimes, in the jargon of financial
analysis proper, as a critique of actual states of opinion in the market at present
(‘speculative value’). Embedded thus in financial analysis, as well as corporate
finance and capital budgeting – and in doctrines of shareholder primacy, priorities
in circuits of credit and conceptions of public finance, etc. – this notion of value
functions, accordingly, as an instrument and criterion for the determination of what
should be done and how, and of what should exist (i.e. receive investment) or not.
This, in a nutshell, is the particular possibility for anthropological critique of value
advocated here: to take ‘value’ not as an analytical concept, the improvement of
which anthropological inquiry should endeavor to contribute to, but as the operational
language of a political technology that ought to be scrutinized. The critical stance is
not about formulating a moral or scientific judgement about the fairness or accuracy
of that concept. Rather about examining the conditions in which the particular notion
of value makes sense – or not – and about inspecting the social order – or disorder –
to which it gives form.
Critical connections to legal imagination
Within such perspective, it is particularly important to pay critical attention to the
performative capacities of the professional rules and expert techniques that make
things ‘fit’ for the purposes of this political technology. Attention is often directed
in this vein towards the crafts of capital accounting and financial valuation. These
do indeed constitute the prime engines for the transformation of all kinds of things
into assets whose value ought to be envisaged from an investment perspective. But
current debates on the constitutive power of the law are pointing usefully towards the
primacy of that other form of expertise in the ‘coding’ of things (to use a metaphor
recently put forward by Katharina Pistor) into the language of financial valuation. The
crafts of financial accounting might set up the ‘code’, but its enforcement is certainly
a matter of legal work.
An anthropological critique of value may then find a most necessary fuel in the
historical anthropology of ‘the operations of the law’ advocated by authors such as
Yan Thomas. The ‘value of things’ emanates primarily, within that perspective, from
juristic artifice – the case of Roman Law being the one favored by Thomas in his
particular approach to the institution of value. Or, in other words: within the craft of
legal articulation lies the generative source of the categories of economic life. This is
perfectly consistent with a perspective that aims at elucidating the constitutive power
of legal language. The task for an anthropological critique of value would then be
to examine the different conditions through which particular doctrines of valuation
populate legal production.
Such perspective finds in contemporary finance a most intense anthropological
challenge. Legal reasoning is increasingly colonized by financial expertise and,
more specifically, by doctrines of investor protection, often justified by an urge
to embed the law into some form of economic realism. A salient example of this
shift is the tendency exhibited by courts to find in techniques such as ‘discounted
cash flow’ a key vehicle to navigate valuation disputes. The ‘Law and Finance’
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movement epitomizes this move towards the juristic encoding of financial political
technology. True, the scientific-normative narrative of political economy can usefully
intervene here through, say, a review of the value metrics that allow gauging
investor protection, or a call for alternative views on value creation that would
consider also the protection of other parties whose rights may have been neglected
from that perspective. The view defended here is different, though. It is about
establishing distance from the vernaculars of value creation to examine how legal
imagination and legal practice are permeated by and reproduce a worldview that
situates the power to order social reality in the hands of financial expertise. Can an
anthropological critique of value be of any use to lawyers? Well, it can perhaps help
bracketing that dependency, and so support lawyers with their emancipation from
concepts that may stifle the constitutive potentials of legal imagination.
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